UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

10-26-2011

State v. Robinson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38816

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Robinson Appellant's Brief Dckt. 38816" (2011). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 2933.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/2933

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ID
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

)

Pia intiff-Appel Iant,

OPY

NO. 38816, 38839

)
)
vs.
)
)
LARRY M. ROBINSON,
)
Defundan~Respondent
)
______________ )

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF MINIDOKA

HONORABLEJONATHANP.BRODY
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

CLAYNE S. ZOLLINGER
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 210
Rupert, Idaho 83350
(208) 436-1122

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature Of The Case .............................................................................. 1
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings ................... 1
ISSUES ............................................................................................................5
ARGUMENT ...................................................................................................6
I.

II.

The District Court Erred When It Concluded That The
Initial Search Was Not Reasonable Under The Fourth
Amendment As A Valid Probation Search .................................. 6
A.

Introduction ......................................................................6

B.

Standard Of Review ......................................................... 6

C.

The Probation Search Was Justified By
Reasonable Suspicion The Probationer Was
In Violation Of His Probation ............................................ ?

D.

The Search Was Within The Scope Of The Fourth
Amendment Waiver .........................................................8

The District Court Erred When It Concluded lt Could
Not Consider Evidence Gathered From The Initial Search
To Determine Whether There Was Authority For The
Probationer To Consent To The Search ................................... 12
A.

Introduction .................................................................... 12

B.

Standard Of Review ....................................................... 13

C.

The State May Support Its Claim Of Actual
Authority With Evidence Found In The Course
Of The Search ............................................................... 13

CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 15
CERTIFICATE OF MAIUNG .......................................................................... 15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

PAGE

Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990) ................................................................ 9
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980) ......................................................... 10
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) .......................................................... 7
State v. Adams, 146 Idaho 162, 191 P.3d 240 (Ct. App. 2008) ............................ 7
State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 95 P.3d 635 (2004) ....................................... 7
State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 984 P.2d 703 (1999) ....................................... 13
State v. Buhler, 137 Idaho 685, 52 P.3d 329 (Ct. App. 2002) ............................ 14
State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 108 P.3d 424 (Ct. App. 2005) ......................... 10
State v. Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 256 P.3d 750 (2011) ...................................... 12
State v. Hansen, 2010 WL 2773331, Docket No. 35519
(Idaho App., July 15, 2010) ........................................................... 12
State v. Johnson, 137 Idaho 656, 51 P.3d 1112 (Ct. App. 2002) ....................... 10
State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 148 P.3d 1240 (2006) ............................. 6, 7, 13
State v. Misner, 135 Idaho 277, 16 P.3d 953 (Ct. App. 2000) ............................ 13
State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227, 657 P.2d 1095 (Ct. App. 1983) .......................... 7
State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 982 P.2d 961 (Ct. App. 1999) ................... 9, 13
State v. Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463, 988 P.2d 689 (1999) ..................................... 10
State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 250 P.3d 796 (Ct. App. 2011 ) ................ 6, 7, 8, 11
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) ..................................................... 7
United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974) .................................................. 13

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The State of Idaho appeals from the district court's order suppressing
evidence.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The

state

charged

Larry

M.

Robinson

with

possession

of

methamphetamine and harboring a wanted felon. (R., pp. 31-33.) The state also
charged him with grand theft. (R., pp. 59-60. 1) Robinson moved to suppress "all
evidence found at the residence." (R., p. 72.)
Amber Prewitt is a probation officer and was supervising Greg Diagneau
on misdemeanor probation. (Tr., p. 7, L. 11 - p. 8, L. 18; Prelim. Tr., p. 25, Ls. 312.) Diagneau lived in Robinson's house. (Prelim. Tr., p. 77, Ls. 3-20.) As part
of his probation Diagneau had signed a Fourth Amendment waiver which read:
"During the term of my probation, I WAIVE my Fourth Amendment rights to
Search and Seizure, based upon a reasonable request of any Probation Officer
and/or Peace Officer. This includes the entire residence, vehicles, outbuildings
and curtilages." (State's Exhibit 1, Terms and Conditions of Probation, p. 2,

,-r

12

(in record at p. 100); see also R., p. 105; Tr., p. 21, L. 19 - p. 22, L. 7.)
Diagneau

had

tested

positive

twice

1

for

the

presence

of

controlled

The cases were combined for purposes of suppression below (R., pp. 146-48)
and have been joined for purposes of appeal (Order Consolidating Appeals (June
10, 2011)).

1

substances and then stopped appearing for his scheduled urinalyses. (Tr., p. 9,
Ls. 12-22.) Officer Prewitt wished to make contact with Diagneau to find out if he
was in fact in compliance with probation and whether he had missed his
appointments due to known transportation problems. (Tr., p. 9, L. 24 - p. 11, L.
4.) She also wished to search his residence for controlled substances because
she suspected he was not appearing for his appointments because he was using
drugs. (Tr., p. 11, Ls. 5-17; Prelim. Tr., p. 27, Ls. 10-21.)
Police officers accompanied Officer Prewitt on the probation search
because they believed a wanted felon was hiding from police at the house where
Diagneau and Robinson lived. (Tr., p. 10, Ls. 12-18; p. 11, L. 18 - p. 12, L. 2;
Prelim. Tr., p. 7, L. 10 - p. 9 L. 8.)

Police presence was usual because the

probation officers do not carry guns and rely on the police for protection and
security. (Tr., p. 13, L. 21 - p. 14, L. 8; Prelim. Tr., p. 26, L. 23 - p. 27, L. 9.)
After being let in to the house by Diagneau's girlfriend, the police officers secured
the residence before the probation officers entered. (Tr., p. 11, L. 18 - p. 12, L.
1O; p. 40, L. 19 - p. 41, L. 15.) Officer Prewitt made contact with the probationer,
Diagneau. (Tr., p. 12, Ls. 10-12; Prelim. Tr., p. 30, Ls. 5-12.) She informed him
at that time that they were present to conduct a search. (Prelim. Tr., p. 30, Ls. 512; R., p. 107; see also Prelim. Tr., p. 39, Ls. 12-15 (Lieutenant Wardle also told
Diagneau the reason the police and probation officers were there).)
At about the time that officers entered they heard the master bedroom
door close. (Tr., p. 29, Ls. 15-23; Prelim. Tr., p. 46, L. 23 - p. 48, L. 1O; p. 56,
Ls. 5-15.) The other bedroom doors were open. (Prelim. Tr., p. 48, L. 22- p. 49,

2

L. 2.)

Officers found the wanted feion hiding under a sink in the master

bathroom. (Tr., p. 12, Ls. 13-17; Prelim. Tr., p. 51, Ls. 3-22; p. 64, Ls. 7-16.) He
had recently showered in the master bathroom and had his clothes, keys and
other items in the master bedroom and was getting dressed in the master
bedroom when the police arrived. (Prelim. Tr., p. 69, Ls. 9-17.)
During the course of the probation interview and search Diagneau's
girlfriend and her female friend from California asked to use the bathroom and,
when granted permission, both used the master bathroom. (Tr., p. 16, L. 2 - p.
17, L. 11.) The only hygiene products in the house were also located exclusively
in the master bathroom. (Tr., p. 15, L. 1 - p. 16, L. 1.)
Probation officers found hypodermic needles and other paraphernalia in
the master bedroom. (Tr., p. 12, Ls. 18-24; p. 30, Ls. 17-21; Prelim. Tr., p. 56, L.
16 - p. 58, L. 14.) Diagneau informed the officers that he had moved out of the
back bedroom and it was no longer his. (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 1-8.) At that point officers
stopped the search and went to apply for a search warrant. (Id.) Thereafter the
state applied for, and obtained, a search warrant for the residence. (R., pp. 1526.)
The district court suppressed the evidence found pursuant to the search
warrant on two bases.

(R., pp. 120-130.)

First, it concluded that the initial

search was improper because it "began prior to Mr. Diagneau being informed of
the search and at no point was a reasonable request made to conduct the
search."

(R., p. 125.)

It then found no apparent or actual authority for

Diagneau's consent because the evidence the state presented regarding

3

authority had been discovered in the course of the search itself. (R., pp. 127,
129.) The state timely appealed. (R., pp. 142-45, 147-53.)

4

ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err when it concluded that the initial search was not
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment as a valid probation search?

2.

Did the district court err when it concluded it should not consider evidence
gathered from the initial search to determine whether there was authority
for the probationer to consent to the search?

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Concluded That The Initial Search Was Not
Reasonable Under The Fourth Amendment As A Valid Probation Search
A.

Introduction
The district court, ostensibly applying State v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 250

P.3d 796 (Ct. App. 2011 ), held that the search was invalid because it "began
prior to Mr. Diagneau being informed of the search and at no point was a
reasonable request made to conduct the search." (R., pp. 123-25.) The court's
analysis is error for two reasons.

First, the Turek analysis applies to

suspicionless searches; probation searches supported by reasonable suspicion
such as in this case are constitutionally reasonable without any probation waiver
whatsoever. Because the officers had suspicion Diagneau was in violation of his
probation the search was constitutionally reasonable and the scope of his Fourth
Amendment waiver was entirely irrelevant. Second, even if reviewed under the
auspices of the probationary waiver, because officers informed Diagneau of their
purpose they complied with the terms of Diagneau's waiver under the holding in
Turek.
B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.

When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.
Klinqler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).
6

State v.

C.

The Probation Search Was Justified By Reasonable Suspicion The
Probationer Was In Violation Of His Probation
Parolees and probationers enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy against

governmental intrusion.

Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); United

States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001).

Thus, a probationer is subject to

warrantless searches by a probation officer if that probation officer has
reasonable suspicion the probationer has violated probation. Knights, 534 U.S.
at 121-22; State v. Anderson, 140 Idaho 484, 487-88, 95 P.3d 635, 638-39
(2004) (defendant released on own recognizance after conviction but before
sentencing is subject to search upon reasonable suspicion); State v. Adams, 146
Idaho 162, 164, 191 P.3d 240, 242 (Ct. App. 2008) (probation searches based on
suspicion are reasonable "[e]ven in the absence of a warrantless search
condition").
In State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496-98, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242-44
(2006), this Court upheld the search of a probationer based on reasonable
suspicion even though there was no Fourth Amendment waiver applicable at the
time of the search. In Turek, the case relied upon by the district court, the Idaho
Court of Appeals recognized that "well-developed law in this area establishes
that probation searches may be conducted without consent when the officers are
there to investigate reasonable suspicion of violation of probation terms." State
v. Turek, 150 Idaho 745, 748, 250 P.3d 796, 799 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Klingler
and distinguishing State v. Pinson, 104 Idaho 227, 657 P.2d 1095 (Ct. App.
1983), in which a probation search based on reasonable suspicion was upheld
where there was no consent to search as a condition of probation).
7

Here the probation officer had reasonable suspicion that Diagneau was in
violation of his probation because he was using controlled substances. Thus,
whether the Fourth Amendment waiver Diagneau executed as part of his
probation justified the search is irrelevant to this case. Because the probation
search was justified by reasonable suspicion it was constitutionally proper. The
district court erred by holding otherwise.

D.

The Search Was Within The Scope Of The Fourth Amendment Waiver
Even if the district court's analysis were relevant, it is still in error.

In

Turek, the similarly worded probation condition "require[d] that the probationer be
informed of an officer's intent to conduct an impending search."

Turek, 150

Idaho at 752, 250 P.3d at 803. Here Diagneau was informed of the purpose of
the police and probation presence in his home upon his initial contact.

(Prelim.

Tr., p. 39, Ls. 12-15 (Lieutenant Wardle told Diagneau the reason the police and
probation officers were there upon contacting him just after entry); Prelim. Tr., p.
30, Ls. 5-12 (probation officer Prewitt informed Diagneau of purposes of visit
upon contacting him); see also R., p. 107 (affidavit of officer Prewitt).) Under the
holding of Turek this search was properly within the scope of the probation
Fourth Amendment waiver.
To the extent the district court found that the probationary search for
contraband preceded the providing of notice the district court is in both legal and
clear factual error. In its factual findings the court stated, "Ms. Prewitt began a
discussion with Mr. Diagneau while police officers were searching all rooms of
the home."

(R., p. 122.)

In its analysis the court stated, "The police officers
8

continued searching the other rooms of the residence while Ms. Prewitt entered
and began informing Mr. Diagneau of the search and its purpose." (R., p. 124.)
This was legal error because the district court failed to recognize the difference
between a protective sweep and a probationary search for contraband.

lt was

clear factual error because the evidence presented shows that the officers
notified Diagneau of the search upon their first contact with him, which preceded
the search, and because it was the probation officers, not police, who conducted
the search for contraband and that search occurred after Diagneau had been
twice informed that he was being subjected to a probationary search.
A protective sweep is justified "when the searching officer possesses a
reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be
swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene."
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990). Protective sweeps are allowable to
protect officers conducting a search. State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 982 P.2d
961 (Ct. App. 1999). Here it was entirely reasonable for the police officers to
enter and secure the residence in anticipation of the probation search because
there was reason to believe an at-large felon attempting to avoid the police had
harbored at the residence.

Because the police were engaged in a protective

sweep, and not the probation search, and because no permission to conduct the
sweep was required, the district court erred as a matter of law when it concluded
that the actions of the officers constituted the probationary search which could
only be conducted after notification to the probationer.

9

The court also erred on the facts. The evidence presented showed that
Lieutenant Wardle entered the house first, made contact with Diagneau, and
explained the purpose of the police and probation presence. (Prelim. Tr., p. 39,
Ls. 5-15.) Only after that was done did the probation officers start searching.
(Prelim. Tr., p. 39, Ls. 16-19.)

Likewise, probation officer Prewitt entered the

home immediately after probation officer Vansant (who conducted the probation
search that revealed the paraphernalia), made contact with Diagneau and
informed him of the intent to search, apparently before Vansant started the
search of the back bedroom. (Prelim. Tr., p. 29, L. 6 - p. 30, L. 12.) In short,
there is no evidence that the probation search upon which the suppression
motion was predicated occurred before Diagneau was notified. On the contrary,
there is clear evidence that notice of probation search was given twice before the
search was conducted.
Even if the start of the search had preceded the notice, the search was
still reasonable. The district court cited no authority for the proposition that the
exact timing of the notice and the search was constitutionally significant where
both occurred contemporaneously. The state submits that like a search incident
to arrest where the search is not invalidated even if it precedes the formal arrest
but is still contemporaneous, Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111 (1980);
State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 282, 108 P.3d 424, 429 (Ct. App. 2005); State v.
Johnson, 137 Idaho 656, 662, 51 P.3d 1112, 1118 (Ct. App. 2002); State v.
Schwarz, 133 Idaho 463, 468, 988 P.2d 689, 694 (1999), the timing of the notice
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relative to the search did not render the probationary search constitutionally
unreasonable because they were contemporaneous.
To the extent the district court concluded that the lack of a "request" is
fatal, the court also erred. The holding in Turek was "that a probation condition
that requires a probationer to submit to a search 'at the request of' an officer
requires that the probationer be informed of an officer's intent to conduct an
impending search." 150 Idaho at 753, 250 P.3d at 804 (emphasis added). This
was not a game of Jeopardy; failure to present the notice in the form of a
question did not render it unreasonable.
Finally,

if the district court concluded that the

"reasonable," it erred.

request was

not

The evidence established very good reasons for the

probationary search-namely that the evidence suggested Diagneau was using
controlled substances in violation of the terms of his probation.

Although the

state does not believe the court actually found the search unreasonable in this
sense, it did include the lack of a reasonable request in its analysis. (R., p. 125.)
If the court was concluding the request was unreasonable it erred.
The actions of the probation officers and police officers in this case were
in full compliance with the Fourth Amendment requirements articulated by the
court of appeals in Turek. Diagneau was twice provided notice of the intent to
conduct a probationary search. That the police conducted a protective sweep to
secure the premises and that the notice was not framed as a question did not
render the probation search constitutionally unreasonable.

11

11.
The District Court Erred When It Concluded It Could Not Consider Evidence
Gathered From The Initial Search To Determine Whether There Was Authority
For The Probationer To Consent To The Search
A.

Introduction
The district court determined that because the evidence relied on by the

state to show actual authority was acquired during the course of the search and
was not known to the state prior to the search the state had failed to show actual
authority. 2 (R., pp. 127-29.) To the extent the district court was holding that the
state obtained such evidence through an improper search, such was erroneous
as explained above. To the extent the district court was holding that the state
may support its claim of actual authority only with evidence within its knowledge
prior to the search, such is directly contrary to law. 3

2

In so ruling the district court relied on the Idaho Court of Appeal's holding in
State v. Hansen, 2010 WL 2773331, Docket No. 35519 (Idaho App., July 15,
2010), wherein the Idaho Court of Appeals found insufficient evidence to show
that the parolee living on Hansen's property had authority to consent to a
probation search of the bathroom. The state notes that this holding was reversed
by the Idaho Supreme Court after the district court issued its order. State v.
Hansen, 151 Idaho 342, 256 P.3d 750 (2011 ).
3

Although its conclusion was that the state failed to show that it was aware of the
communal nature of the bathroom by evidence it acquired before the search, the
district court also mentioned that some of the facts did not necessarily show that
the bathroom was communal. (R., pp. 127-28.) It is the state's position that this
did not constitute an alternative holding. To the extent it might be considered
such the court erred. The totality of the facts shows communal use of the
bathroom. Such facts include that the only toiletries in the house were in that
bathroom and Diagneau's girlfriend and her friend visiting from California clearly
used the master bathroom as their primary bathroom. In addition, the only
reason the door to the master bedroom was closed (a fact cited by the district
court) was that Bean, the wanted felon, who was using the master bathroom to
shower, closed it as soon as he heard the police enter.
12

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a

decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts.

State v.

Klingler, 143 Idaho 494,496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006).

C.

The State May Support Its Claim Of Actual Authority With Evidence Found
In The Course Of The Search
Voluntary consent to enter or search premises from a person with

authority to consent vitiates the need for a warrant. 4 State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho
215, 219, 984 P.2d 703, 707 (1999) (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S.
164, 170 (1974)). Actual authority to consent to a search arises from "mutual use
of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most
purposes, as in the case of married couples or joint tenants." State v. Brauch,
133 Idaho 215, 219, 984 P.2d 703, 707 (1999) (internal quotation omitted).
Under this joint access and mutual use rationale, a third party probationer who,
as a condition of probation waives his Fourth Amendment rights and consents to
searches, may validly consent to a warrantless search of a residence if he has
actual authority over it, even if it is shared by others. See State v. Misner, 135

4

As more fully set forth above, the police conducted a protective sweep of the
house, including the master bedroom and bathroom. The scope of the probation
consent did not limit the scope of the protective sweep. State v. Schaffer, 133
Idaho 126, 982 P.2d 961 (Ct. App. 1999). Thus, the court erred in suppressing
any evidence related to the harboring charge because such evidence was
discovered by the police in the course of the protective sweep.
13

Idaho 277, 16 P.3d 953 (Ct. App. 2000).

To determine whether a party had

actual authority to consent to a search, a court may rely on evidence discovered
during the challenged search. State v. Buhler, 137 Idaho 685, 689-90, 52 P.3d
329, 333-34 (Ct. App. 2002).
In the portion of its opinion addressing actual authority the district court
stated that observations that the master bathroom was communal and accessed
only through the master bedroom "were made after the initial search of the
residence" and such evidence was unknown "prior to the search." (R., p.127.)
The district court concluded that "the State was not aware of the possible
communal nature of the master bathroom prior to conducting the search." (R.,
pp. 127-28.)

Because the district court required the state to prove actual

authority by evidence known to it before the search and did not consider the
evidence found as a result of the search, it erred as a matter of law. Reversal
and remand for consideration of this evidence is appropriate.

14

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court's
determination that the probation search was invalid, and to vacate the district
court's conclusion that the probationer lacked authority to consent to a search of
the entire house and remand for application of the correct legal standards to that
question.

DATED this 26th day of October, 2011.
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Deputy Attorney Gtner~
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